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MODESTY AS KINDNESS
Alan T. Wilson
Abstract
The trait of modesty has received significant philosophical atten-
tion in recent years. This is due, in part, to Julia Driver’s claim that
modesty is able to act as a counter-example to intellectualist
accounts of the nature of virtue. In this paper I engage with the
debate about the nature of modesty by proposing a new account.
‘Modesty as kindness’ states that the trait of modesty ought to be
considered as intimately connected with the more fundamental
virtue of kindness. I set out the account, explain its benefits and
defend it against possible objections. I then ask whether or not the
intense focus on the trait of modesty has actually furthered our
understanding of the nature of virtue more generally, and suggest
that alternative approaches ought to be considered.
Introduction
The level of philosophical attention lavished upon the trait of
modesty over the past twenty or so years is nothing short of
remarkable. The effort that has gone in to providing an account
of this trait and an explanation for its status as a virtue must surely
make modesty one of the most discussed traits in the recent virtue
literature. Originally, the focus on modesty had a more funda-
mental aim. Julia Driver has argued that modesty can be used as
a counter-example in order to cast doubt upon intellectualist
accounts of the virtues – accounts which view virtue as necessarily
involving some form of intellectual excellence such as relevant
special knowledge or understanding. However, as the debate has
intensified, the attempt to explain the nature of modesty has also
proven to be of independent interest. In this paper, my main aim
is to engage with this debate by providing a convincing account
of modesty. This account views modesty as being intimately con-
nected with the fundamental virtue of kindness, and I will argue
that it is able to provide those benefits which are required of any
successful account. Following this, I will briefly ask whether or not
the intense focus on modesty has been useful in advancing the
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more fundamental debate about the nature of virtue. I will suggest
that we would do well to consider other approaches to this issue –
including attempting to understand a wider range of different
specific virtues.
1. Driver’s Underestimation Account
The current debate regarding the nature of modesty was
prompted by an account of that trait defended by Julia Driver in
several papers and in her book Uneasy Virtue.1 Driver’s aim was to
use modesty as the prime example of a ‘virtue of ignorance’ – a
virtue which requires ignorance and so which tells against intel-
lectualist accounts of the virtues.2 According to Driver, modesty
consists in an agent being ignorant of their own true level of worth
(or ability or accomplishment). The modest agent is one who
systematically underestimates these things, and who would con-
tinue to do so in the face of evidence to the contrary. Driver sums
up her account, and the implications for theories of virtue, in the
following way:
What the analysis comes down to is this: for a person to be
modest, she must be ignorant with regard to her self-worth. She
must think herself less deserving, or less worthy, than she actu-
ally is . . . Since modesty is generally considered to be a virtue,
it would seem that this virtue rests upon an epistemic defect.3
This underestimation account has acted as a catalyst for debate
about the nature and virtue-status of the trait of modesty. In
defence of this controversial account, Driver claims that it pro-
vides three benefits which should be required of any successful
approach. Firstly, the underestimation account explains why we
would find it strange to hear someone proclaim “I am modest”.
Driver states that we would find this strange because being modest
involves being ignorant of your self-worth, and so the truly modest
agent would not be self-aware enough to utter the phrase. The
1 Julia Driver, Uneasy Virtue, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). See also,
Driver ‘The Virtues of Ignorance’, The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 86, No. 7, (July 1989)
pp. 373–384 and Driver ‘Modesty and Ignorance’, Ethics, Vol. 109, No. 4, (July 1999)
pp. 827–834.
2 Driver, Uneasy Virtue, Chapter 2.
3 Ibid. p. 19.
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truth of the phrase is incompatible with the agent actually believ-
ing it.4 Secondly, the underestimation account makes it easy to
understand what false modesty consists of and why we might find
it an undesirable trait. To be falsely modest, on this account,
would be to have an accurate or even inflated view of your own
achievements while giving the impression that you underestimate
them. If the agent’s deception is discovered then others will feel
‘patronized’ or ‘condescended to’ and so false modesty will have
a negative social impact.5 Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
Driver claims that the underestimation account is able to explain
why we value modesty. The ignorance of the modest agent sug-
gests that they are less concerned with comparing themselves to
others and such a person ‘seems less likely to provoke an envious
response in others’.6 Driver’s underestimation account therefore
appears to allow us to do three things: (i) explain the strangeness
of the phrase “I am modest”, (ii) provide a plausible correspond-
ing account of false modesty and (iii) explain why modesty is a
valuable trait. For this reason, it cannot be immediately dismissed.
Any rival account will gain plausibility by also providing these
three benefits.
Despite these supposed benefits, there is good reason to reject
the underestimation account of modesty. The two main problems
facing Driver’s view are that (1) the explanation given for the
value of modesty is inadequate, and (2) the conditions suggested
for modesty are not sufficient. Regarding the first of these two
problems, Driver has claimed that, on her view, modesty would
help to reduce cases of envy and that this is why we regard it as a
valuable trait. However, there is reason to think that this cannot
be why we value modesty. In addition to worrying that systematic
underestimation of self might be more likely to increase cases of
envy, it is also unclear that reducing the likelihood of envy is
enough to make a character trait valuable.7 There are other traits
which look like they could reduce cases of envy while not being
considered valuable. I believe the most obvious of these would be
successful cases of false modesty. If an agent is particularly good
at convincing others that they are a modest and unassuming
4 Ibid.
5 Ibid. p. 27.
6 Ibid.
7 Daniel Statman argues convincingly that underestimation would be more likely to
increase cases of envy in ‘Modesty, Pride and Realistic Self-Assessment’, The Philosophical
Quarterly, Vol. 42, No.169, (Oct. 1992) pp. 420–438, at p. 424.
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individual then it seems that there will be no difference in effect
between false modesty and genuine modesty. And yet, we do not
value successful instances of false modesty. G. F. Schueler has
suggested other traits or attributes which can make a similar
point. Those with a dull wit or mediocre sporting ability are less
likely to generate envy as a result of these traits and yet this is not
enough for those traits to be considered valuable.8 The point here
is clear – even if Driver is correct to say that modesty reduces cases
of envy in society, this cannot be enough to fully explain why
we value the trait. The explanation of why we value modesty is
inadequate.
The second and perhaps more damaging problem facing
Driver is that the conditions suggested for modesty are not suffi-
cient. It is possible to meet the requirements of the underestima-
tion account while not possessing the trait of modesty. Schueler
provides an example of someone who believes that they are the
second greatest scientist of the century while in fact being the
greatest.9 Such an individual could still be incredibly boastful
about what they think is their level of achievement, perhaps
cruelly ridiculing colleagues for their relative lack of ability and
demanding that others show them respect in various humiliating
and distasteful ways. As long as such an agent continues to under-
estimate their true level of achievement (and would do so in the
face of some contrary evidence) then they meet Driver’s condi-
tions for being modest. And yet, it does not seem right that the
boastful scientist should be considered a modest agent. The
underestimation account is not sufficient.
It is important that we correctly diagnose the failing in Driver’s
account which allows for the boastful scientist counter-example.
And the correct diagnosis can be achieved by noting that rival
accounts will be subject to similar counter-examples so long as
they focus entirely on features internal to the agent. If modesty is
solely a matter of how an agent rates their own abilities or of how
they compare themselves to others, variants of the boastful scien-
tist case will be possible. This is true for various rival accounts,
including those which demand that the agent not over-estimate
their worth, those which demand that the agent acknowledge the
equal moral worth of all humans, and those which demand that
the agent compare themselves against the standard of idealised
8 G. F. Schueler, ‘Why Modesty is a Virtue’, Ethics, Vol. 107, No. 3, (Apr. 1997) pp.
467–485, at p. 469.
9 Ibid. p. 470.
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agents.10 In each case, it will be possible for the agent to be both
proud and obnoxiously boastful about some ability that they do
possess. Perhaps, then, we would do better in avoiding the prob-
lems that afflict the underestimation account by tackling this issue
in a direct way. What is needed is an external requirement – a
restriction on how the truly modest agent will behave in their
interactions with other people.11 If our account of modesty stipu-
lates that the modest agent be disposed not to brag or boast or
ridicule others for their relative lack of ability, then we can be
confident in ruling out problems analogous to the boastful scien-
tist objection. However, this stipulation alone will not be enough.
We can easily imagine a case where this disposition is present
but where we do not believe the agent to be truly modest – for
example, in cases where the agent’s intention is to trick others
or to gain the benefits of a good reputation. Such a case would
appear closer to false modesty than genuine modesty. The solu-
tion to this problem, therefore, is to provide a behavioural restric-
tion which also successfully excludes cases of false modesty. I will
now propose an account which provides such a restriction while
also providing the three benefits listed above.
2. Modesty as Kindness
We now have four requirements that must be met by any success-
ful account. When presenting her own account, Driver high-
lighted three benefits which it would be desirable to provide – (i)
an explanation of the strangeness of the phrase “I am modest”,
(ii) a plausible corresponding account of false modesty and (iii)
an explanation of why genuine modesty is a valuable trait. We can
add a further requirement to this list – (iv) the account should
include a behavioural component in order to avoid the boastful-
scientist-type objections which are problematic for other
accounts. I will now propose an account of modesty which is able
to satisfy all of these requirements.
10 I have in mind here the theories proposed by Owen Flanagan, ‘Virtue and Ignorance’,
The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 87, No. 8, (Aug. 1990) pp. 420–428, Aaron Ben-Ze’ev, ‘The
Virtue of Modesty’, American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 30, No. 3, (July 1993) pp. 235–246,
and Jason Brennan, ‘Modesty without Illusion’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
Vol. 75 No.1, (July 2007) pp. 111–128 respectively.
11 Michael Ridge argues for the necessity of such a requirement in ‘Modesty as a Virtue’,
American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 37, no. 3, (July 2000) pp. 269–283, at pp. 271–272. A
basic dispositional approach is also mentioned (and rejected) in Driver, Uneasy Virtue,
Ch.2.
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My suggestion is that the trait of modesty ought to be consid-
ered as closely related to the more fundamental virtue of kind-
ness. It is at least part of the nature of kindness that the kind agent
will be concerned to protect and promote the well-being of
others. The modest agent is one who shares this concern and who
is influenced by it in the way that they present themselves. The
‘modesty as kindness’ account (MK) can be set out in the follow-
ing way:
To be modest is to be disposed to present your accomplish-
ments/positive attributes in a way that is sensitive to the poten-
tial negative impact on the well-being of others, where this
disposition stems from a concern for that well-being.
This account is able to satisfy the four conditions that were set out
above. The account can (i) explain why there would usually be
something strange about the phrase “I am modest”. Given that
modesty is taken to be a positive trait, the agent who utters the
phrase would be providing evidence that they lack a disposition
that is a key part of genuine modesty. However, MK does show us
that the phrase is not necessarily incompatible with genuine
modesty, as Driver appears to have thought. If the agent in ques-
tion does not consider modesty to be a valuable trait, or if they
believe themselves to be in a situation where no-one’s well-being
would be negatively affected (for example, in a job interview or
among close friends) then the statement could perfectly well be
compatible with genuine modesty. This seems to me to be the
correct result. And MK also appears to get things right with
regards to (ii) giving an account of false modesty. To possess (the
persistent trait of) false modesty is to possess the same disposition
regarding how you present your accomplishments/attributes but
where this disposition stems from the wrong kind of motivation.
Examples would include the desire for personal gain (for
example, downplaying some positive attribute in order to ingrati-
ate yourself with your boss, or to encourage the general public to
like you so that they buy your autobiography).
Perhaps the most important benefit of MK is that it (iii) allows
us to fully explain why modesty is a valuable trait. First of all, the
account suggests that modesty will have the very same social ben-
efits that Driver claimed were predicted by the underestimation
account. The modest agent avoids bragging and boasting about
their achievements out of a concern for the negative effect on
6 ALAN T. WILSON
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those who would do badly by comparison. One side-effect will be
that the modest agent is unlikely to provoke envy and dislike in
others and so will have the ameliorating social impact that was
described by Driver. In addition to this, we can now also see that
the possession of modesty is indicative of a kind and caring nature
on the part of the modest agent. The modest agent is concerned
to protect and promote the well-being of others through their
self-presentation, and so will be likely to also possess the virtue of
kindness. Indeed, I believe that modesty can be considered as
simply an expression or manifestation of the more fundamental
virtue of kindness. Such a view of modesty as a restricted form of
kindness makes it clear why modesty is a morally valuable trait,
and explains the intuition that modesty be included on a list of
the moral virtues. But even a more conservative view (on which
modesty is merely good evidence for the separate virtue of kind-
ness) will be able to explain that intuition. Either way, the modesty
as kindness account is able to adequately explain the value of
modesty.
The three benefits that were demanded by Driver have been
provided by the modesty as kindness account. Furthermore, by
focusing on how the modest agent presents themselves to
others, MK is able to (iv) avoid the boastful-scientist-type exam-
ples which are problematic for purely internalist accounts. And
this feature also allows MK to provide one further benefit. One
interesting use to which the term “modest” has sometimes been
put is as a description of someone who dresses conservatively
and in a way which seeks to conceal their body from others. This
usage can be explained by MK. Modesty is a matter of being
sensitive in your self-presentation out of a concern for the well-
being of others. And there is more than one way in which the
failure to be “modest” in one’s dress may have been thought
likely to negatively affect the well-being of others. Most obvi-
ously, the failure to dress “modestly” might generate feelings of
either disgust or of inadequacy in others. In addition to this, in
societies where sexual thoughts are judged sinful, the failure to
be “modest” in one’s appearance may be considered damaging
for encouraging others into sin. Indeed, the fact that this usage
of the term has become less frequent may be connected to a
reduction in such understandings of sin. MK gains credibility by
being able to explain this usage, in addition to being able to
provide the other benefits that have been listed. I now want to
respond to some possible objections to MK, before moving on
MODESTY AS KINDNESS 7
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to consider the implications for a general theory of the nature
of virtue.
3. Possible Objections to Modesty as Kindness
Objection 1 – High Opinion
A first response which might be prompted by the modesty as
kindness account is that it allows for the modest agent to have a
high opinion of themselves. As long as an agent is disposed to
present themselves in a way that is sensitive to the possible nega-
tive impact on the well-being of others, and as long as this dispo-
sition stems from a concern for that well-being, then the agent can
think very highly of their own accomplishments or attributes and
still be classed as modest. Consider a variation on the boastful
scientist. A proud scientist may share with the boastful scientist the
belief that their work is really very impressive indeed. But as long
as they are motivated to downplay how they present their impres-
siveness whenever doing so would harm the well-being of others,
the proud (but kind) scientist can be counted as modest. Do we
really think that having such a high opinion of yourself is consist-
ent with genuine modesty? I believe that it is, and that this is a
matter of wide consensus within the literature on modesty. For
example, Driver’s underestimation account allows for a modest
agent to have an extremely high opinion of their own worth as
long as their assessment is slightly less positive than is actually
deserved.12 And this is also a feature shared by a large number of
the accounts put forward by rivals of Driver.13 Perhaps this is
enough to show that it is not widely considered to be the case that
having a high opinion of yourself is a barrier to possessing
modesty. Some people do have genuinely impressive attributes or
accomplishments, and awareness of this should not automatically
render the agent immodest. The scientist who uncovers a cure for
12 See Driver, Uneasy Virtue, p. 19.
13 For example, Flanagan’s non-overestimation account allows an agent to think very
highly of themselves so long as they do not overestimate their own value – high but
accurate self-evaluation is perfectly fine (see ‘Virtue and Ignorance’ pp. 424–425). Ben
Ze’ev asks for the agent to view their fundamental human worth as similar to that of other
people – but this is consistent with viewing your human worth very highly, as well as with
viewing your specific accomplishments and attributes very highly (see ‘The Virtue of
Modesty’ p. 237). And Ridge’s account in ‘Modesty as a Virtue’ makes no demands
regarding the agent’s self-evaluation.
8 ALAN T. WILSON
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some significant illness does not lose the potential for modesty
upon realising the greatness of their accomplishment. Roger
Federer could perfectly well be modest despite correctly believing
that he is more talented than almost anyone else who has ever
played tennis. In short, an agent can recognise their own high
level of accomplishment while still being genuinely modest. MK is
no worse off in allowing for this possibility.
Objection 2 – Inaccurate Opinion
When responding to the first objection, I appealed to other
accounts of modesty in order to show that MK is in line with the
common consensus. In doing so, there was one important differ-
ence between MK and some of the other accounts that was
obscured. MK allows for the modest agent to have a high opinion
of themselves that is not an accurate reflection of their true level
of accomplishment or ability. That is, not only can the modest
agent evaluate themselves highly, the modest agent can even over-
estimate their own level of ability. There is no requirement within
MK that a modest agent’s self-evaluation be accurate. And this
may appear to be a more worrying problem for my proposed
account. There will be many (in the literature and beyond) who
do not believe that a genuinely modest agent can go around
overestimating themselves. To make matters worse, it is possible
to generate a rival account which avoids this conclusion. All that
would be required is to amend MK by adding a requirement
that the modest agent have an accurate understanding of their
attributes or accomplishments.14 Call the amended version of
modesty as kindness which requires accurate self-assessment
‘intellectualised modesty as kindness’ (IMK). It seems clear that
this approach will retain many of the benefits that I have claimed
are provided by MK. Intellectualised modesty as kindness there-
fore looks like a strong contender. And if we have the intuition
that overestimation of self is incompatible with genuine modesty
then we will have every reason to accept IMK and to reject my
proposed account. The challenge, then, is to show that genuine
14 Such an account would be similar to one that has recently been proposed by Irene
McMullin (although on her account the accurate self-evaluation appears to play a more
primary role by actually generating the agent’s desire to avoid harm to others). See
McMullin, ‘A Modest Proposal: Accounting for the Virtuousness of Modesty’, The Philo-
sophical Quarterly, Vol. 60, No. 241, (October 2010) pp. 783–807.
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modesty is indeed compatible with overestimation and that, there-
fore, the amendment to MK is not necessary.
In order to meet this challenge, I want to consider two different
types of case. First of all (and as with so many other issues), things
can be made clearer by imagining a brain-in-a-vat. Such a being
will receive all of the same kinds of experience as a normal person,
but these experiences will be artificially created for them by sci-
entists. In reality they are just a brain floating in a vat. In such a
case, a great many of the beliefs held by the brain will be inaccu-
rate. For example, the brain-in-a-vat may believe themselves to be
an exceptionally skilled break-dancer, and their evidence may
seem to back-up this self-assessment. But the truth of the matter,
of course, is that the brain-in-a-vat is not able to break-dance – they
are significantly overestimating their own abilities.15 And yet, it
does not seem to be true to say that the brain-in-a-vat is incapable
of modesty. It would be overly harsh (as well as incorrect) to
inform the brain that not only can it not break-dance, but it could
never have been modest about it either. As long as the brain is
disposed to present their break-dancing ability in a way that is
sensitive to the well-being of others, and the brain is motivated out
of a concern for that well-being, then we have every reason to say
that the brain is being genuinely modest about what it takes to be
its ability to break-dance. Indeed, if it was revealed that we are all
in fact brains-in-vats, this fact alone should not lead us to question
the modesty of any of those people who were previously accepted
as possessing that trait. If this case is convincing (and we believe
that the brain could indeed be modest) then we ought to deny the
claim that genuine modesty is incompatible with the overestima-
tion of self. The proposed amendment should then be rejected
and we ought to prefer MK to IMK.
The second type of case that I want to consider is one where
the inaccuracy in the agent’s beliefs is much less widespread.
Instead we can consider a case where a simple miscalculation or
misremembering leads an agent to overestimate their accom-
plishments. Imagine a restaurateur who believes herself to have
15 This example would need to become significantly more complicated if we accept
David Chalmers’ view that there is a sense in which some envatted beings could truly
possess such abilities, as well as possessing positive attributes such as lovely eyes or an
impressive physique. It would take us too far from the central thread of this paper to discuss
these possible metaphysical complications. See Chalmers, ‘The Matrix as Metaphysics’ in
Susan Schneider (ed.) Science Fiction and Philosophy, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.,
2009).
10 ALAN T. WILSON
© 2014 The Author. Ratio published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
played a major role in catering for a party of five hundred people
and who is proud of having accomplished this feat. The restau-
rateur, however, is careful in how and when she advertises her
accomplishment. She listens politely when others tell of having
catered for three hundred people and does not feel the need to
belittle that (lesser) achievement. When colleagues complain of
having to deal with (a mere) two hundred customers she holds
her tongue and refrains from phrases such as “You think two
hundred is bad? I once catered for a party of five hundred!” And
when she is pressed for details of the event, she is sure to
acknowledge the contribution of others who were working on
that fateful day. In short, the restaurateur is disposed to be sen-
sitive to the well-being of others in how she presents her accom-
plishment, and is motivated by that well-being. The restaurateur
is a paragon of modesty. And we should not change our assess-
ment of her even if we find out that she has misremembered and
the actual number of customers served was four hundred and
fifty, or even four hundred. Her modesty lies in how she was
disposed to act based on what she took her level of accomplish-
ment to be, rather than in her accuracy when assessing that
accomplishment. An agent can perfectly well be modest about
what they take their level of accomplishment or ability to be,
even if the true level is somewhat lower. The proposed account
of modesty as kindness is no worse off in allowing for this pos-
sibility. Therefore, we ought to reject the proposed amendment
to MK and resist the move to IMK.
The above cases have hopefully shown that it is possible to
possess genuine modesty despite having an inflated view of your
own accomplishments or attributes. However, perhaps this is not
enough. Even if we now accept that there are some cases where
overestimation is compatible with genuine modesty, isn’t there
still something suspicious about other cases? What about the phi-
losopher who always assumes that their own theories are superior,
but who is nevertheless disposed to act in ways that conceal this?
Can this agent be considered truly modest? In order to answer this
question, more detail is required. First of all, we need to clarify the
agent’s motivation for concealing their belief that their own theo-
ries are generally superior to others. If the disposition stems from
a desire to be well-regarded or to gain a promotion then MK can
agree that this agent lacks modesty – they are being falsely modest.
Genuine modesty requires that the agent be motivated by a
concern for the well-being of others. Secondly, we need to
MODESTY AS KINDNESS 11
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confirm whether or not the agent is correct to think that their
theories are generally superior. If so then we will have a case of
high but accurate opinion and MK (as well as many other theo-
ries) will rightly tell us that the agent can indeed be modest.
Thirdly, we ought to ask whether or not the agent has strong
evidence for their belief, even if it is inaccurate. If so, then we will
have a case similar to the two that were detailed above and I have
already argued that we have good reason to accept those as cases
of genuine modesty. Therefore, in order for this kind of case to
be different from those previously discussed, it must have three
features: the agent must be motivated by a concern for the well-
being of others, the agent must be over-estimating the general
superiority of their theories, and the agent must have less-than-
convincing evidence for their belief in this superiority. With these
features in place, we need to ask whether or not MK would class
this agent as genuinely modest, and whether or not that verdict is
acceptable.
It seems clear that MK is bound to classify the agent in this case
as genuinely modest. They are disposed to be sensitive to the
well-being of others when presenting what they take to be their
level of accomplishment, and we have stipulated that they are
motivated by a concern for that well-being. How then can we
explain the suspicion that the philosopher (who wrongly and
without good evidence believes their own theories to be superior)
does not deserve to be classed as truly modest? One possibility is
that the willingness to believe in one’s own superiority without
good evidence indicates that the agent is being unkind when they
evaluate other people. As an account that views modesty as closely
related to kindness (and possibly even as a restricted form of
kindness), MK can agree that we are justified in being suspicious
about the agent’s modesty. Alternatively, it is possible that our
suspicion is being caused by some other failing. The agent cer-
tainly appears to possess certain epistemic vices that would make
us want to criticise their character, and it is possible that we simply
misdiagnose their failing as a failing of modesty. Finally, it is
possible that more work needs to be done to clarify the precise
relationship between the trait of modesty and the trait of humility.
It is often assumed that these two traits are one and the same, and
this would explain why cases of a lack of humility (like the phi-
losopher in our example) are assumed to be cases of a lack of
modesty. If we instead reject the assumption that modesty is iden-
tical to humility, then we can accept the verdict of MK that the
12 ALAN T. WILSON
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philosopher is being modest, while explaining the mistaken intui-
tion to the contrary. As long as at least one of these explanations
for our intuition in the case of the overestimating philosopher is
plausible (appeal to evidence of a lack of kindness, appeal to an
epistemic failing or appeal to a distinction between modesty and
humility) then we can happily accept the judgement of MK in
such a case. This fact, coupled with the points made above, should
lead us to deny that MK faces any serious threat from cases of
inaccurate opinion.
Objection 3 – Deception
A final objection that I will consider is that the proposed account
attributes genuine modesty in cases where an agent is being pur-
posely deceptive. I have suggested that modesty is compatible with
the agent having a false view of their own level of ability (like the
brain-in-a-vat), but it might be thought that modesty is incompat-
ible with having an accurate view of such abilities. To know very
well how impressive you are while sometimes presenting yourself
as being less impressive is deceptive. The disposition to do so is
therefore an unappealing one – even when motivated by a
concern for the well-being of others. And if the disposition being
described is unappealing, then it either cannot be the correct
account of modesty, or it will have shown us that modesty must not
be a virtue.
This objection can also be dismissed. First of all, it is not clear
that the modest agent will necessarily have to be deceptive. As
Ridge points out, ‘A person may fail to emphasize some fact, say
that he is a world-famous philosopher, without making any effort
to get those around him to reject the proposition corresponding
to that fact.’16 All that might be required is that the agent not go
out of their way to draw attention to their accomplishments (or
positive attributes) in cases where doing so might have a negative
impact on others. And this is not deceptive. Secondly, it is not
clear that the disposition to deceive in cases where another’s
well-being is at stake is an unappealing one. Perhaps I should be
disposed to lie or mislead when confronted with a situation where
telling the truth will be (unnecessarily) harmful. This simply
amounts to being tactful, and we intuitively think that this can be
a perfectly nice, and perhaps even admirable, trait to possess. So
16 Ridge, ‘Modesty as a Virtue’, p. 272 (emphasis in original).
MODESTY AS KINDNESS 13
© 2014 The Author. Ratio published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd
even if modesty on the proposed account could involve deceit, it
is not clear that this makes modesty unappealing. And, thirdly, it
seems that if we did demand that the modest agent not have an
accurate view of their own worth, then this might make it harder
to support the idea that modesty is a virtue. A trait which is
incompatible with self-knowledge looks to be far more unappeal-
ing than one which simply allows for (benevolent) deceit. In terms
of allowing for the value of modesty to be explained, we would be
better off supporting MK than to demand ignorance from the
modest agent.
It seems, therefore, that the modesty as kindness account is able
to respond to these possible objections. I believe that this, coupled
with the benefits of MK that were highlighted above, makes a
strong case for the acceptance of this account. Before concluding,
I now want to take some time to consider whether or not the
intense focus on the trait of modesty has been useful in the way
that was originally hoped.
4. Has Modesty Furthered the Debate About Virtue?
Let us now re-focus on Driver’s original intention when discussing
the trait of modesty. While the nature of that trait has proven to be
of considerable interest in its own right, the consideration of
modesty was originally supposed to perform a more fundamental
role. Driver believed that modesty could be used as an example to
show that intellectualist accounts of the nature of virtue were
incorrect. Virtue cannot always require an intellectual component
(of the sort that is suggested by Aristotle’s phronesis, for example)
if there are some virtues that actually consist in the agent being
persistently ignorant. If the underestimation account was correct,
therefore, this would cast serious doubt on those intellectualist
accounts of virtue. However, it has been shown that Driver’s
underestimation account of modesty is not correct. Given this, is
there still anything special about the trait of modesty that will
allow it to shed light upon the nature of virtue more generally?
Consider again the modesty as kindness account. On this view, it
is entirely possible for the modest agent to possess the same
seemingly epistemic defects that were mentioned by Driver. It can
be the case that the agent lacks self-knowledge due to underesti-
mating (or overestimating) their own accomplishments, they can
fail to be sensitive to the evidence that should inform them of
14 ALAN T. WILSON
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their true worth, and they can fail to correctly understand how
their abilities compare to those of other people. While these
failings are not required by modesty as kindness, they are consistent
with that account. Given this, MK still looks to be bad news for
intellectualist accounts of virtue. Virtue cannot necessarily involve
the impressive levels of knowledge and understanding that are
required by these accounts if an agent can possess a virtue despite
the kind of epistemic failings just listed. Therefore, while Driver
was wrong in her account of the nature of modesty, she may have
been right in her suspicions of intellectualist understandings of
virtue.
However, I now want to suggest that the trait of modesty is not
actually doing anything special here. When discussing the “Inac-
curate Opinion” objection, above, I defended my account of the
nature of modesty against a rival account which demanded an
intellectualist component in the form of relevant knowledge. My
conclusion was that we should not add such an intellectualist
amendment to MK. However, we can now see that it would be
possible for this same argument to take place focusing on some
other plausible (moral) virtue. The suggestion is made to add
some form of intellectualist component and we have to consider
whether or not such an amendment is necessary. We do this by
considering cases where the amendment is not satisfied and
asking whether or not the agent could still be rightly thought of
as possessing the virtue in question. As a result of this we either
endorse the intellectualised or the non-intellectualised account.
This same process can take place for any of the candidate virtues
and not just for the trait of modesty. Therefore, while the trait of
modesty has received a great deal of philosophical attention, it is
incorrect to think that this level of attention can be fully justified
by modesty playing some special role in our understanding of
virtue. If this more fundamental issue is our aim then the debate
ought to move on to consider other approaches. Indeed, it may be
the case that the strategy employed above will be a useful one – we
consider examples where the agent suffers from severe and rel-
evant epistemic handicaps (such as actually being a brain-in-a-vat)
and we ask whether or not this disqualifies the agent from posses-
sing the relevant virtue. Running through such a process for a
range of different specific virtues and using a range of different
suggested intellectualised amendments may do more to shed light
on the fundamental issue of the nature of virtue than has the
interesting quest for an account of modesty.
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Conclusion
The struggle to provide a successful account of the nature of
modesty has become a fiercely competitive one in recent years. In
this paper I have attempted to provide an account which adds to
this vibrant and interesting debate. Modesty as kindness says that
to be modest is to be disposed to present your accomplishments/
positive attributes in a way that is sensitive to the potential nega-
tive impact on the well-being of others, where this disposition
stems from a concern for that well-being. I have argued that this
account is able to provide the benefits that are required for a
successful account, as well as being able to respond to possible
objections. As such, the modesty as kindness account is deserving
of serious consideration within the modesty debate. On a further
note, I have briefly questioned the assumption that modesty is
capable of playing a special role in highlighting the nature of
virtue more generally. I have suggested that the debate ought to
now move on to consider other approaches and other specific
virtues rather than continuing with the intense focus upon the
trait of modesty alone.17
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